

Protecting C++ Dynamic Dispatch Through VTable Interleaving

Benjamin Zanger

Technical University of Munich
Department of Informatics
Chair for IT Security

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TUM Uhrenturm

Outline

Dynamic Dispatch in C++

- Virtual Functions in C++

VTable Hijacking

Protecting Dynamic Dispatches

- VTable Ordering

- VTable Interleaving

- Multiple Inheritance


- Optimization

Benchmarks

Comparison with other Approaches


Virtual Functions in C++

```
class A {  
public:  
void f0() {}  
virtual void f1() {}  
virtual void f2() {}  
int int_in_A;  
};  
  
class B : public A {  
public:  
void f1() {} //override f1  
int int_in_B;  
};
```



Multiple Inheritance

```
class A1 {  
public:  
void f0() {}  
virtual void f1() {}  
int int_in_A1;  
};  
  
class A2 {  
public:  
virtual void f2() {}  
int int_in_A2;  
};  
  
class B : public A1, public A2 {  
public:  
void f1() {} //override f1  
int int_in_B;  
};
```



VTable Hijacking

- Exploiting memory corruption, for example use after free.
- VTables are stored in read only memory, vptr in writable memory.
- Changing vptr to take control over program flow.
- Either code injection or reuse attacks possible.

Assumptions made by the authors:


- Hacker capable of modifying the Heap.
- Registers are safe.

Protecting Dynamic Dispatches

- Most strategies use **Inline Reference Monitors** (IRMs) before dynamic dispatch calls.
- Example for semantic of IRMs:

$$vptr \in \{0x08, 0x20\} \tag{1}$$

⇒ Differences are in the implementation.




VTable ordering (OVT)

- Preorder traversal of the class hierarchy.
- Padding added, so that VTable addresses are 2^n Bytes aligned.
- Address point ranges are stored.
- Example¹:

```

0x18 Artti      ] A
0x20 Afoo      ]
0x28 <padding> ]
0x30 <padding> ]
0x38 Brtti     ] B
0x40 Bfoo     ]
0x48 Bbar     ]
0x50 <padding> ]
0x58 Drtti    ] D
0x60 Dfoo     ]
0x68 Bbar     ]
0x70 Dboo     ]
0x78 Crtti    ] C
0x80 Afoo     ]
0x88 Cbaz     ]
    
```



Class	Start	End	Alignment
A	0x20	0x80	0x20
B	0x40	0x60	0x20
C	0x80	0x80	0x20
D	0x60	0x60	0x20

¹Bounov, Kici, and Lerner 2016.

VTable Ordering (OVT)

- Simple range check and alignment check before dispatch call.

Problems of VTable Ordering:

- Takes more memory than necessary because of padding.
- Especially an issue in systems with limited memory (embedded systems).

⇒ VTable Interleaving

VTable Interleaving (IVT)

- Interleaving of different VTables, by making them sparse, to save memory.
- Saving different functions offsets.
- Example²:


	A	B	D	C
0x00	Artti			
0x08		Brtti		
0x10			Drtti	
0x18				Crtti
0x20	Afoo			
0x28		Bfoo		
0x30			Dfoo	
0x38				Afoo
0x40		Bbar		
0x48			Bbar	
0x50			Dboo	
0x58				Cbaz

VTable Entry	Old Offset	New Offset
rtti	-0x8	-0x20
foo	0	0
bar	0x8	0x18
boo	0x10	0x20
baz	0x8	0x20

²Bounov, Kici, and Lerner 2016.

Handling Multiple Inheritance

- Multiple Inheritance can be decomposed into several single inheritances.
- Each single inheritance is managed individually.



Implementation of IRMs

- Checking necessary if $vp\text{tr} \in [a, b]$ and $vp\text{tr} \bmod 2^n = 0$.

Trivial implementation:

```
cmp $vptr, $a
jlt  FAIL
cmp $vptr, $b
jgt  FAIL
and $vptr, 1111...n
cmp $vptr, 0
jne  FAIL
... ;Success
```


Enhanced implementation:

```
$diff = $vptr - $a
$diffR = rotr $diff, n
cmp $diffR, ($b-$a) >> n
jgt  FAIL
... ;Success
```


Benchmarks

- Implemented approaches into the LLVM compiler.

Runtime overhead³:



Binary size overhead⁴:



³Bounov, Kici, and Lerner 2016.

⁴Bounov, Kici, and Lerner 2016.




Other Approaches

- Other compiler based techniques (SafeDispatch⁵, VTV⁶).
 - Similar runtime and binary overhead.
- General CFI which protect all control transfers (also normal function pointers and returns).
 - Bigger runtime overhead.

⁵Jang, Tatlock, and Lerner 2014.

⁶Tice et al. 2014.

References

-  [Bounov, D., R. G. Kici, and S. Lerner \(2016\)](#). “Protecting C++ Dynamic Dispatch Through VTable Interleaving.”. In: *NDSS*.
-  [Jang, D., Z. Tatlock, and S. Lerner \(2014\)](#). “SafeDispatch: Securing C++ Virtual Calls from Memory Corruption Attacks.”. In: *NDSS*.
-  [Tice, C. et al. \(2014\)](#). “Enforcing Forward-Edge Control-Flow Integrity in GCC & LLVM.”. In: *USENIX Security Symposium*, pp. 941–955.