

# OpenSGX: An Open Platform for SGX Research

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# Introduction

1. Why TEE is necessary?
2. How to adopt the traditional software development into TEE model?
3. Access to the SGX platform is (currently) limited [2016]

# Introduction

1. Why TEE is necessary?
2. How to adopt the traditional software development into TEE model?
3. Access to the SGX platform is (currently) limited [2016]
4. openSGX
  - 4.1 Emulates Intel SGX
  - 4.2 Implements on Instruction-level
  - 4.3 Extends open-sourced QEMU emulator
  - 4.4 Includes emulator, emulated OS layer, enclave program loader/package, user library, debugging supporting and performance monitoring

# Background

## 1. Intel SGX

- 1.1 SGX memory protection : enclave model
- 1.2 Enclave Page Cache (EPC)
- 1.3 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
- 1.4 User-level and privileged instruction

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## 2. OpenSGX Specification


- 2.1 Faithfully implements the Intel SGX specification
- 2.2 Extends to support OS, debugging and monitoring
- 2.3 Not implement all Intel SGX's instruction

# Background

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3. Threats
  - 3.1 Assumes an adversary can control all software components
  - 3.2 Considers the thwart attacks mounted by system software
  - 3.3 Denial-of-service is our of scope

# System Overview - Components

1. Emulated Intel SGX hardware
2. OS Emulation
3. Enclave program loader
4. OpenSGX user library (sgxlib)
5. Debugger support
6. Performance monitoring





# Design - Hardware Emulation

1. Instruction Set Architecture (ISA): User and Super privilege
2. Enclave Page Cache (EPC)
  - 2.1 A contiguous memory region
  - 2.2 Sgx\_init() allocates and initializes the system-wide EPC pages
3. EPC access protection
  - 3.1 An enclave accesses only its own EPC pages
  - 3.2 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM): maintains these access permissions
  - 3.3 Enclave and non-enclave accesses
4. EPC encryption
5. Data structure and SGX

# Design - OS Emulation

1. Bootstrapping: `sys_init()`
2. Enclave initialization
  - 2.1 SGX Instruction: `ECREATE`, `EADD`, `EEXTEND` and `EINIT`
  - 2.2 `sys_create_enclave()`
3. EPC page translation: virtual address to physical address
4. Dynamic EPC page allocation
  - 4.1 `EAUG`, `EACCEPT`
  - 4.2 `sys_add_epc()`
5. Performance monitor
  - 5.1 Custom identifier (`Keid`)
  - 5.2 `sys_stat_enclave()`
6. System call emulation
  - 6.1 Emulates system call as a function call
  - 6.2 Context switching
  - 6.3 State Save Area (SSA)
  - 6.4 `sgx_add_epc()`

# Design - Loader

## 1. Compilation

1.1 Toolchain: opensgx generates an enclave program

1.2 Structure of enclave program: code, data sections, linked libs

## 2. Loader

2.1 Determines the memory layout of code, data, stack and heap sections

2.2 Obtains the information about code and data as well as base address

2.3 Forwards the memory layout information to the OS emulation

# Design - User library

1. User-level library - sgxlib
2. Host APIs and ENCLAVE APIs

Type	API	Description
HOST	void sgx_init(void)	Perform system initialization
HOST	void sgx_enter(tcs_t tcs, void (*aep)())	EENTER wrapper
HOST	void sgx_resume(tcs_t tcs, void (*aep)())	ERESUME wrapper
HOST	int sgx_host_read(void *buf, int len)	Read from enclave
HOST	int sgx_host_write(void *buf, int len)	Write to enclave
HOST	void launch_quoting_enclave(void)	Launch quoting enclave
ENCL	void sgx_exit(void *addr)	EEXIT wrapper
ENCL	void sgx_remote(const struct sockaddr *target_addr, socklen_t addrlen)	Request remote attestation
ENCL	void sgx_getkey(keyrequest_t keyreq, void *key)	EGETKEY wrapper
ENCL	void sgx_getreport(targetinfo_t info, reportdata_t data, report_t *report)	EREPORT wrapper
ENCL	int sgx_enclave_read(void *buf, int len)	Read from host
ENCL	int sgx_enclave_write(void *buf, int len)	Write to host
ENCL	void *sgx_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t size)	Memory copy
ENCL	void *sgx_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t size)	Memory copy
ENCL	void sgx_memset(void *ptr, int value, size_t num)	Memory set to the specified value
ENCL	int sgx_memcmp(const void *ptr1, const void *ptr2, size_t num)	Memory comparison
ENCL	size_t sgx_strlen(const char *string)	Get string length
ENCL	int sgx_strcmp(const char *p1, const char *p2)	String comparison
ENCL	int sgx_printf(const char *format, ...)	Write formatted data to standard

# Design - User library

1. User-level library - sgxlib
2. Custom in enclave library
3. Shared code and data memory trampoline and stub
4. Enclave - Host communication: Pipe-liked mechanism
5. Dynamic memory allocation
6. Defense against malicious host apps and OS
7. Remote attestation

# Design - Defense against malicious host apps and OS

1. Memory-related operations (MEM)
2. Network and I/O services (IO/NET)
3. Non-determinism and resources (DBG, TIME, RAND)

# Debugging

1. Debugging hardware
2. Debugging enclaves: gdb-stub
3. New gdb commands: info epc, info epcm, info secs and list enclaves

# Design - Performance Monitoring

1. Enclave descriptor: stores TCS and usage statistics
2. Number of context switches
3. Entries/exits of the OS emulation layer
4. Number of TLB flushes
5. Number of dynamically allocated EPC



# Case studies - Shielding Tor Nodes

1. Attacks on Tor
  - 1.1 Manipulating Tor Components
  - 1.2 Manipulating routing
2. Benefits of applying TEE
  - 2.1 Attestation of software components
  - 2.2 Protection against tampered OS
  - 2.3 contains all critical operations that use private data structures in Tor-enclave
  - 2.4 expose an RPC interface to Tor-non-enclave

# Secure I/O Path

1. Allows secure communication between the CPU/memory and devices
2. Emulates the encrypted communication channel with message authentication

# Performance Profiling

1. Environment setup
2. The number of EPC pages used
3. Additional CPU cycles
4. Context switch overhead
5. The number of RPC calls

Questions?