



Systems Hardening Seminar (SHS)

SHS - Season 0, Pilot

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Chair of IT Security (I20)

Wintersemester 2020/2021
13 July 2020

- ▶ self-proclaimed **virtsec**¹ team within I20
- ▶ we evaluate CPU virtualization extensions (e.g. Intel VT-x, ARM, ...) in the context of security
- ▶ mitigate **code-reuse attacks, data-oriented attacks**², **heap misuses**, ...
- ▶ combat **split-personality malware**³ ...
- ▶ we like to play **CTFs** in our spare time

¹**virtualization security**

²*"xMP: Selective Memory Protection for Kernel and User Space"*

³*"Hiding in the Shadows: Empowering ARM for Stealthy Virtual Machine Introspection"*

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- ▶ ... and **hold a presentation** at the end of the semester.

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- ▶ **Virtual machine introspection**
 - ▶ stealthier VMI, faster VMI, ...

- ▶ Phase *nulla*: **Solve a remote qualification challenge** (details will follow) → 2 weeks
- ▶ Phase I: **Pick a topic** → 1 week⁷
- ▶ Phase II: **Read literature** → 1 week
- ▶ Phase III: **Write (first draft) / Prototype** → 6 weeks
- ▶ Phase V: **Peer review** → 1 week
- ▶ Phase VI: **Write (final paper) / Prototype** → 5 weeks
- ▶ Phase VII: **Talk preparations** → 1 week
- ▶ Phase VIII: **Extend your prototype into research (optional)** → *TBD*

⁷Timeline is estimate; a detailed schedule will be announced before the start of WS2021

- ▶ time & place: **Wednesdays, 10:00 - 12:00 (meeting biweekly)**, room **01.08.033**
 - ▶ ...or online via **BBB** depending on how regulations develop
- ▶ however, we will have **intermediate deliverables/presentations**
- ▶ optional: irregular tutorials organized by us (scientific writing, interesting kernel/hypervisor CTF challenges, new processor features, ...)
- ▶ talks at the **end** of the semester
- ▶ **10 student slots** (5 teams \times 2) \implies **qualification challenge** (next slide)
- ▶ don't forget to register via **the matching system until 21.07.2020!**
- ▶ target audience: **Master's & Bachelor's**
- ▶ language of instruction: **English**
- ▶ prerequisites: **operating systems, C & assembly** (x86 and/or ARM), Intel/ARM architecture specifics (useful), virtualization extensions (useful)

- ▶ solve an **easy CTF-like** kernel/hypervisor challenge
- ▶ goal: connect to the **challenge server**
- ▶ and **extract the secret** (aka **flag**) from our **underlying (Xen) hypervisor**
- ▶ **send the obtained flag and your source code** (in a **.tar.gz**) to momeu@sec.in.tum.de⁸
- ▶ deadline: **26th of July 23:59**
- ▶ successful candidates have **priority** in the seminar

⁸PGP fingerprint: AD5A C550 7719 BD65 8165 0F39 D190 0A83 0CD1 3295

- ▶ challenge hosted on praksrv.sec.in.tum.de → ssh user: **gogaia**, ssh pass: **A3fdV7ZK7R**
- ▶ on each connection we spawn a minimalist Xen guest **DomU** where you have root access
- ▶ underlying Xen hypervisor stores a **64-byte flag⁹** in one of its procedures
- ▶ **⇒ write a Linux kernel module that calls the Xen function to get you the flag**
- ▶ we provide the source code for the Xen hypervisor, DomU kernel, config files, and relevant server-side scripts
 - ▶ you may download the qualification challenge from our [website¹⁰](https://www.sec.in.tum.de/i20/teaching/ws2020/systems-hardening)!

⁹flag template: **flag{shs_...}**

¹⁰<https://www.sec.in.tum.de/i20/teaching/ws2020/systems-hardening>

- ▶ we provide the virtualization API in the **Xen hypervisor** on our x86 servers
- ▶ for convenience, we will prepare for you an **ARM server, with Xen** deployed
- ▶ (normally) you **extend your kernel**, and test it on our servers in a Xen guest¹¹
 - ▶ if needed, we can extend Xen to assist your use-case
- ▶ **whatever (else) you need, we're here for you, and we'll find a solution**
 - ▶ simply drop to our office **01.08.057**, or shoot us an email
- ▶ we'll keep in **constant sync** in-between the phases

¹¹ aka **domU** - an unprivileged Xen guest VM

40 %	Final Paper (Content, Style, Language, Scope, ...)
15 %	Prototype / Design / Experiments
10 %	Review
30 %	Presentation (Content, Speaking, Style, Timeliness, ...)
5 %	Discussion


Σ 100 % Total

- ▶ Literature sources
 - ▶ <https://scholar.google.com>
 - ▶ <https://semanticscholar.org>
 - ▶ <https://dblp.uni-trier.de>
 - ▶ <https://arxiv.org>
- ▶ Get around paywalls using <https://www-ub-tum-de.eaccess.ub.tum.de/datenbanken>
- ▶ Researchers' homepages can be **valuable!**
 - ▶ source code, raw data, instructions, technical information, ...

Questions?

momeu@sec.in.tum.de

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 @MariusMomeu

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