Description
Additive manufacturing has gained a lot of popularity and is used in a variety of fields. Even safety-critical
applications like medical devices are implementing 3D-printed parts. However, cyber-physical systems like
3D printing environments can get targeted by attackers. When it comes to cyber-physical systems, an important
but often overlooked property are side channels, like sound or heat emissions. This work looks at several side
channels that are given in additive manufacturing systems.
The thesis provides an in-depth analysis of four of the most important channels and several side channel combinations
from the perspective of an attacker and a defender. The concept of maximum restorable information is introduced and
is used throughout the thesis to determine the effects of certain attacks and whether they can be detected or reconstructed
by a side channel.
After performing the analysis, the acoustic and the spatial side channel are analyzed further practically. A prototype for
gathering and analyzing acoustic data is developed and the feasibility of nozzle tracking with home-grade equipment is
tested. Based on the result of the acoustic analysis, the assumption that specific nozzle movements lead to unique acoustic
profiles is further manifested.
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Thesis topic in co-operation with the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security AISEC, Garching